THERE ARE FOUR POLITICAL FAMILIES IN THE NEW IRAQ
by Amir Taheri
Gulf News
February 3, 2005

The elections showed that politics, and not religion or ethnicity, is the key to understanding the emerging balance of power in post-liberation Iraq. The first, and strategically the most important, fact revealed by the election is the commitment of a majority of the Iraqis to a pluralist democratic system. Despite death threats from the terrorists and instances of administrative incompetence by the election organisers, almost 14 million Iraqis out of a total of 16 million eligible, registered to vote. This was, by any standards, a massive vote of confidence in democracy as the future system of government for Iraq.

At the time that this column was written the final official tally for voter participation was not known. But all indications were that almost two-thirds of those registered to vote went to the polls. Considering the level of violence and the lack of adequate logistics, that, too, is an impressive figure.

The message is clear: a majority of Iraqis want a democratic system and, given a chance, are prepared to take risks to help build it. Beyond that central and all important message, the Sunday elections also reveal another crucial fact: Iraqi politics cannot be reduced to a simple, not to say simplistic, schema. If anything, the key word here is diversity. The 111 political parties that took part in the election represent the widest imaginable variety of ideologies and political opinions.

Broadly speaking the election revealed the existence of four political families in post-liberation Iraq. My guess is that, in time, Iraq's political forces, rather than being divided on the basis of tribal or confessional loyalties, will end up coalescing into these four big ideological families.

The first, and perhaps the largest for the time-being, consists of parties, groups, and personalities that put Iraqi-ness (Al Uruqah) at the centre of their identity. Those who see Al Uruqah as the organising principle of their political discourse believe that Iraq must focus on building new political institutions, modernising its economy, and further developing its culture.

One can find the adepts of Al Uruqah in all camps: Arab Shiites, Arab Sunnis, Kurds, and others. They may differ on economic and foreign policies, and may be socially liberal or conservative; but they all sing from the same hymn sheet when it comes to national strategies. This does not mean that the adepts of Al Uruqah are banal nationalists and/or xenophobic chauvinists of the kind one finds in so many other so-called "developing countries".

Rather, they are patriots who realise that Iraqis, living in a rough neighbourhood, have to stick to one another to prevent the dismantlement of their country and the absorption of its bits and pieces into larger states where Iraqi-ness would, at best, be regarded as nothing but a folkloric quirk.

The second large family that is identified by the elections could be described as Islamist. This does not mean that all members of this family wish to create an Islamic state modelled on those of Iran or Sudan. There is, in fact, virtually no support for either of those models. Members of this family emphasise Islam as a common denominator that could bring the Iraqis together regardless of ethnic and confessional differences. Again, this emphasis on Islam has adepts within all communities, Arab Shiites and Sunnis, Kurds and others. This family provides a political home for social conservatives and all those who believe that Islam can and must develop its own responses to the challenges of the modern world without provoking a war of civilisations.

The third family revealed by the elections belongs to Westernisers of all denominations. Here one finds a wide spectrum from neo-liberals to Social Democrats, and even Communists. Members of this family may disagree on numerous issues of economic and foreign policies. But they have in common a strong desire to develop secular institutions.

The fourth, and currently the smallest, family revealed by the elections could be labelled pan-Arabist. Mainly supported by Arab Sunnis, this family is based on the belief that Arab-ness (Al Urubah) is the core of Iraqi identity. Pan-Arabists see Al Uruqah as an illusion designed to lure the Iraqis away from the larger Arab family of nations.

Because they represent many different strands of opinion, all the four families include some extremist elements. Nevertheless, the good news is that moderates appear to be in a majority in all four families. That shared moderation is further strengthened by a realisation that the people of Iraq will not tolerate a new form of despotism under any label. This means that while ideological differences will remain present in the background, they will not be the prime mover of politics in post-liberation Iraq.

The coming battles in Iraqi politics will be fought on concrete issues of policy rather than abstract ideological ones. Shiites, Sunnis, Kurds and other ethnic and religious communities are more likely to be split over such issues as the economic model, foreign policy, the rights of women, and the role of the state in providing welfare, rather than rival visions of an ideal society.

The de-ideologisation of politics is an essential step towards democratisation in any society, and newly-liberated Iraq is no exception. A key task of the new Iraqi leadership would be to de-emphasise ideology and, over time, guide Iraq's politics towards pragmatism.

One must remember that one election a democracy does not make. Iraq would need four, five, or, perhaps, even 10 more free elections before it can be sure that it will never again fall victim to any form of despotism. What happened last Sunday was the first crucial step towards an honest assessment of political forces in Iraq and the creation of conditions for the emergence of a moderate centre.

Amir Taheri is an Iranian author of ten books on the Middle East and Islam. He is a member of Benador Associates