The US retreat from democratization By Erich Marquardt
An important motive behind the Bush administration's intervention in Iraq was the goal of fostering democracy in the Middle East. This motive, recognized as critical to United States interests following the September 11 attacks, is based on the belief that autocratic, non-democratic states have a higher potential to create disaffected individuals who join political groups that seek to use violence to exercise their political grievances. This pattern is especially prevalent in the Middle East, where autocracy is the norm and where most of the militants attacking US interests are located.
Therefore, following the September 11 attacks, the Bush administration argued that the successful formation of democracy in Iraq would serve as an example to other Middle Eastern states. For one, it would provide a warning that the creation of a functioning market democracy in the region is possible, even through the use of force by an outside power. Additionally, by transforming Iraq from a country ruled by a dictator to one ruled by a democratically elected government, Washington hoped that citizens of autocratic states in the region would no longer stand by obediently while they were forced to obey an unpopular and autocratic regime.
While this was an important motive behind the intervention in Iraq, it has now lost the support of Washington policymakers, in addition to many insiders within the Bush administration. The reason behind this loss of support has been the continuous failure to transform Iraq into a market democracy. While it is still possible to arrest Iraq's present downward trend, until that moment occurs there will be little support for further test cases of democratic transformation in the Middle East.
Democratic transformation With the 2000 election win of President George W Bush, the administration appointed a select few individuals among the neo-conservative class of the American political spectrum. These officials - with the most prominent neo-conservative represented by Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz - were branded with a certain sense of idealism, believing that a democratic transformation of the Middle East was very possible through outside intervention, explaining why this political class has been labeled "democratic imperialists".
For example, before the invasion of Iraq began, influential members of the American Enterprise Institute - one of the leading institutions of neo-conservative thought - released repeated statements arguing the positive effects that an invasion of Iraq would bring. Joshua Muravchik, a resident scholar at the Institute, stated in August 2002, "Change toward democratic regimes in Tehran and Baghdad would unleash a tsunami across the Islamic world."
In September 2002, Michael Ledeen, a freedom scholar with the institute, called for the US to begin "a vast democratic revolution to liberate all the peoples of the Middle East". Ledeen succinctly argued the critical point of this theory, announcing that "it is impossible to imagine that the Iranian people would tolerate tyranny in their own country once freedom had come to Iraq. Syria would follow in short order." Bush himself stated in his 2004 state of the union address that "... we will finish the historic work of democracy in Afghanistan and Iraq, so those nations can light the way for others, and help transform a troubled part of the world."
Theoretically, a democratic transformation of the Middle East could occur following the successful implantation of a market democracy there. However, the reason that this theory is hinged too much on idealism is that it exaggerates the ability of an outside power to create such a structure. Furthermore, the difference in culture and values between the implanting power - the US - and the recipient states - predominately of Islamic culture - also works negatively against the success of such a theory.
Iraq: The first test case These doubts were manifested in the US intervention of Iraq. While it only took weeks to eliminate the Ba'athist regime, many months have passed and there is still little stability throughout the country. Indeed, there is no evidence to definitively state whether progress is being made or lost. According to US senator Lincoln Chafee, who just returned from Iraq, and a member of the Bush administration's Republican Party, the situation has become worse in the last year. Speaking to CNN, Chafee said, "It's a very tenuous security situation. I'd been there a year ago - what a change ... in the Green Zone a year ago we felt very secure. Not so this time."
The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) has also questioned the viability of the Iraq intervention. The New York Times reported on December 7 that it had received a classified cable from the CIA's station chief in Baghdad warning that the security situation in Iraq will soon deteriorate further unless some major successes are scored.
Until it can be determined whether progress is being made or lost in Iraq, the intervention will do nothing to encourage other Middle Eastern political leaders and citizens to push for a democratic transformation in their countries; indeed, as of now, it has done the very opposite and has demonstrated the potential anarchy that can erupt following the weakening of a central government or the creation of a temporary power vacuum.
Furthermore, the intervention of Iraq demonstrated the political, military and economic toll that can affect the US negatively if an intervention goes awry.
For instance, while the Bush administration won the 2004 presidential election, it has lost a lot of support from the American people, and the population itself is split almost evenly into two political camps. Much of this national divergence can be blamed on the impact of the Iraq intervention to both the US military and economy.
The US has lost over 1,000 soldiers in Iraq, and it has been forced to keep over 100,000 troops in the country, with the total troop commitment presently hovering around 150,000. This sort of troop obligation has stretched the US military to the point where its present global commitment is simply unsustainable. The ramifications of the extended troop commitment to Iraq are already evident, seen through the May 2004 decision to withdraw an army brigade from the US Army's 2nd Infantry Division in South Korea to Iraq.
Finally, the funds required to sustain present operations in Iraq are exorbitant, helping to swell the US budget deficit to US$413 billion. Over the long term, continued high spending in Iraq could bring economic problems, such as an extended trade deficit and high inflation.
All of these factors explain how the intervention of Iraq has given the US little ability to engage in future interventions, whether for another test of democratic transformation or even for legitimate national security concerns. The troop commitment and financial costs being usurped by the Iraq intervention have weakened the ability of the US to project its power in the world.
If the Bush administration were to have seriously considered all the likely scenarios involved in the intervention in Iraq - including worst case scenarios - it is doubtful that it would have carried through with the invasion. Th
