As the post-election crisis in Iran enters its third week, one thing is clear: the oxymoron that was the Islamic Republic is already dead.
If the radical faction led by Ali Khamenei, the Supreme Leader, wins the power struggle, Iran will drop its “republican” pretensions to become an Islamic emirate or an imamate. But if the opposition wins, the theocratic aspect of the regime will end, allowing Iran to become a normal republic in which power belongs to the people.
For 30 years, Iran has suffered from a split personality: trying to remain faithful to the late Ayatollah Khomeini’s ersatz version of Islam while pretending to have a people-based system of government.
The moment of truth for the death of the Islamic Republic came when Ayatollah Khamenei broke with tradition and declared Mahmoud Ahmadinejad the victor in the election even before the polls had closed. Over the past two weeks he has ignored demands for a rerun of the controversial election or even a complete recount of the votes, insisting that Mr Ahmadinejad is President not because the people elected him but because the Supreme Leader says so.
Over the past 30 years the Islamic Republic has organised 30 elections at various levels, from local to presidential. In every case the Supreme Leader merely endorsed the results once they had been established and announced by the Government. That kept alive the fictitious claim that the Islamic part of the system recognised the republican element. This time, however, that separation disappeared, as Ayatollah Khamenei not only announced the results but also stated publicly that he had wanted Mr Ahmadinejad to win.
The government-controlled media have highlighted the change in the nature of the regime. They now refer to Ayatollah Khamenei’s speech endorsing Mr Ahmadinejad’s re-election as “Fasl el-Khitab”, a theological term that means “end of the discussion”. Propaganda now refers to the ayatollah as “Emir al-Momeneen” (Commander of the Faithful), a title initially used for Ali ibn Abi-Talib, the Prophet’s cousin and son-in-law and the first imam of Shiaism.
An editorial last week in Kayhan, whose editor is appointed by the Ayatollah, put the new situation in graphic terms: “Imam Ali is back, the Commander of the Faithful. But this time he is not alone!” The editorial said that Iran was now ruled by “the Vicar of Allah” in a “pure Muhammadan system”.
The new system that seems to be emerging in Iran appears to be modelled on two Islamic states of recent times. The first is the imamate in Yemen — in which a descendant of the Prophet through Imam Ali ruled the country, with the Koran regarded as the imamate’s only Constitution. That was ended by a military coup in 1960. The second is the emirate set up by the Taleban in Afghanistan in the 1990s: any pious man could become emir, enabling Mullah Muhammad Omar, a Pushtun with no Arab ancestry, to gain the title of Commander of the Faithful. Ayatollah Khamenei, who claims descent from the Prophet, could base his claim of legitimacy on the more specifically Shia doc
