|
BY AMIR TAHERI A Persian proverb says: "From this signpost on the road to the next, there is hope!" And it was in that spirit that the International Atomic Energy Agency decided last Saturday to give the Islamic Republic of Iran until 25 November to comply with its obligations under the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT). The resolution passed by the IAEA's 35-nation board of governors criticises Iran for "lack of candour" over its nuclear programme and calls on the Islamic Republic to suspend all uranium enrichment activities that could contribute to producing fuel for a nuclear bomb. The resolution warns that the agency "considers it necessary" that Iran halt its uranium enrichment programmes, and meet all of the agency's demands within the next eight weeks. But is this an ultimatum? Hardly. This is, in fact, the third time in two years that the IAEA has fixed "a signpost" for Iran before moving to the next with no more than some timid huffing and puffing. IAEA spokesmen have made it clear that, come 25 November, they would simply "review the situation" once again. The new "signpost" suits all sides of this bizarre dispute. The mullahs will get two more months in which to hasten whatever it is that they are doing. The Bush administration, which has been making loud noises about the threat of a nuclear-armed Islamic Republic, is happy because the potentially explosive issue is postponed until after the US presidential election in November. The Europeans, who have already burned their fingers by trying to coax the mullahs into a diplomatic solution, have their own reason to be happy: the IAEA's decision gives them time to see who will be the next US president. If Bush is re-elected, the European Union would find it hard to continue the diplomatic dance with the mullahs. If Senator John Kerry is the winner, however, new horizons could open for deal-making with the mullahs. It is important to understand what this dispute is really about. On the surface it is about uranium enrichment. The process , in which uranium is converted into a gas and spun in centrifuges to concentrate more fissile isotopes, is used to produce fuel for nuclear reactors, but it can also produce material for making nuclear weapons. Signatories to the NPT are allowed to enrich uranium for peaceful purposes, provided the IAEA is allowed to keep an eye on the operation to make sure it will not be used for weapon-making. Iran had a uranium enrichment programme in 1978, two years before the mullahs seized power . At the time Iran was also a shareholder in Eurodif, a company formed to mine uranium in Gabon and enrich it in France, Spain and Iran. No one objected to the Iranian programme because Iran, one of the 11 countries that had originally sponsored the NPT, was suspected of seeking nuclear weapons. There is no doubt that Iran has the scientific, technological and industrial base to produce weapons' grade uranium. But this is also true of almost all other signatories of the NPT, including those that do not belong to the so-called " nuclear weapons club". The real question, therefore, is this: does the IAEA trust Iran's present leadership? The present Iranian leadership has never committed itself to foreswearing nuclear weapons forever, and cannot do that for at least two reasons. The first is that no regime worth its salt will voluntarily limit its options when it comes to national defence, especially when none of its neighbours are asked to do the same. Iran is at the centre of a region with the largest number of nuclear powers: Russia, China, India, Pakistan, Israel, and the United States, thanks to the NATO presence in Turkey. One might also add Egypt which is not a signatory to NPT and thus might be engaged in activities beyond the ken of the IAEA . The " Supreme Guide" Ali Khamenehi has issued a statement forbidding the use of nuclear weapons, but not manufacturing them. The second reason is that the present Iranian regime, like others that claim a messianic mission, is in conflict not only with the regional status quo , which it sees as a threat, but also against the so-called global system dominated by the Islamic Republic's arch-foe, the United States. Iran's national defence doctrine, as developed since 1989, is based on the so-called " pre-emptive defence" concept. The assumption is that the enemies of the Islamic Republic and its Islamist ideology will, at some point, use military threat and/or action to check the spread of its influence, especially in its "natural habitat" of the Middle East, the Caspian Basis and the Gulf. To meet those threats the Islamic Republic needs three assets: a capacity to sustain large casualties in long wars, a massive arsenal of medium and long-range missiles to compensate for the weakness of its air force, and a nuclear arsenal to deter the " big powers", meaning the United States, that wish to curb Tehran's regional ambitions. Without its nuclear component, the Iranian national defence doctrine would have little value beyond diplomatic gesticulations. The question therefore is not to persuade Iran to abandon the nuclear component of its dotcorine but to revise its regional and global ambitions. An Iran that does not want to "export" its Khomeinist ideology or reshape the map of the region will not be a threat even if it has nuclear weapons. One question that is often asked is why should Iran be singled out while others, notably India, Pakistan and Israel, are allowed to do as they please? The answer is that India, Pakistan and Israel are not signatories of the NPT and have no obligation to act in accordance with the rules of the IAEA. Developing and deploying nuclear weapons is not illegal. The Islamic Republic is not the victim of any conspiracy or unjust treatment. It could withdraw from the NPT, and do as it pleases. The problem is that the mullahs want to have it both ways. They want to stay in the NPT so as to benefit from legal access to technology, equipment and materiel. If they withdraw from the IAEA whatever they buy would be regarded as illegal and banned by the signatories of the NPT. The problem, as stated above, is one of trust. The IAEA's chief, Mohamed El-Baradei made that point abundantly clear when he said Iran needed to suspend its enrichment activities "in order to restore confidence". Last year, Iran agreed to suspend enrichment after it was found to have concealed an extensive illegal programme, a breach of its treaty obligations. But it almost immediately began to " cheat-and-retreat" over what activities were covered. In July, Iran resumed the manufacture of centrifuge parts and the assembly of centrifuge units, while pledging not to use thos |
|
|