June 17, 2009
Posted: 2:19 am
June 17, 2009
The New York Post
THE events of the last four days in Iran have reduced "Supreme Guide" Ali Kha menei to just another politician -- and the crisis has not yet ended.
On Saturday, Khamenei declared President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's re-election to be "an historic triumph for Islam" and invited Iranians to celebrate. Just 48 hours later, the same Khamenei was promising a recount and "other measures" to correct "errors that might have occurred" in the election.
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The partial U-turn came after millions of Iranians poured into the streets of the capital Tehran and other major cities with shouts of "Marg bar Doktator!" (Death to the dictator!), calling for the election to be annulled.
No one now expects Khamenei to order a real recount, let alone a re-run of the election -- if he can get away with it. Yet his hasty endorsement of the results, followed by his partial U-turn, has already shattered a good part of his authority.
In the Khomeinist system, Khamenei is supposed to represent divine power on earth, via the "Hidden Imam." He is supposed to be the leader of all the world's 1.3 billion Muslims, with the power to suspend the rules of Islam itself, if and when he so wishes.
His word is supposed to be final on all matters; when he speaks, Allah has spoken. Now he looks like just another politician engaged in a bitter power struggle for the control of the country.
The rigged election has highlighted a three-way split within the regime:
* One faction -- call it "the bitter-enders" -- still believes that nothing has changed, that it can continue with Ahmadinejad's agenda for "preparing the world for the return of the Hidden Imam."
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* A second faction, effectively led by former President Hashemi Rafsanjani and now including Mir Hussein Mousavi (the top losing candidate in the presidential election), hopes to keep the regime intact by softening its image at home and abroad and moving toward a Chinese-style system in which tight political control is combined with economic liberalization.
* A third faction believes that the entire Khomeinist system has passed its sell-by date and that Iran is ripe for regime change in the same way that the Soviet bloc countries were in the late 1980s. This faction is led by people like former Interior Minister Abdallah Nuri (a mid-ranking cleric), former rector of Tehran University Muhammad Abbas Sheybani and former members of parliament like Mahmoud A'alami and Imadeddin Baqi.
It now seems likely that Mehdi Karrubi -- a mullah who was another of the three losing candidates -- may also be joining them. In a statement published in Tehran yesterday, Karrubi claimed that Khamenei's nomination as "Supreme Guide" in 1989 had also been "a fruit of fraud" -- an implicit call for him to step down.
The rigged election has also split the military. The third losing candidate was Gen. Mohsen Rezai Mir-Qaed -- who led the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps for 16 years.
Rezai's humiliating defeat -- in an election widely viewed as rigged -- has angered many Guard officers, who see him as something of a father figure. Defense Minister Gen. Mustafa Muhammad Najjar has praised Ahmadinejad in public -- but the commander of the Revolutionary Guard, Gen. Ali Jaafari, has maintained a meaningful silence. More, he has refused to send in Guard units to crush demonstrations in Tehran and 16 other major cites.
Since Ahmadinejad owes his ascent to support from the military-security establishment, any split in the Guard and its allied organs could spell trouble now.
Some compare the current popular unrest with the riots that shook Iran during Muhammad Khatami's presidency. But there are a number of key differences:
* Khatami was not as unpopular personally as Ahmadinejad is. Thus, Khatami was always able to act as a bridge between protestors and the "authorities."
* Back then, Khamenei managed to stay above the fray -- thus preserving the system's prestige, if not any actual popularity. This time, he has (for reasons hard to fathom) jumped in the ring in support of Ahmadinejad.
* Today, some heavyweights of the regime are siding with the protestors -- shattering the unity of the Khomeinist establishment in the face of a popular challenge. With every day that passes the number of dignitaries declaring support for Ahmadinejad declines -- while the number of those calling for his dismissal increases.
* This protest movement isn't limited to students in major cities. There are numerous reports of unrest in small towns and villages across the country. In some places, like Marivan and Gohar-Dasht, people have attacked government offices, burning the portraits of Khamenei and Ahmadinejad and seizing control of ballot boxes.
However the current struggle turns out, the regime has lost a good part of its legitimacy. It is also made clear that peaceful evolution within the regime is not possible. This makes the "regime change" option attractive for the first time since the mid-1990s.
