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Ever since Senator John F. Kerry emerged as the Democrat Party's presumptive presidential nominee last spring, his Republican opponents have been accusing him of harbouring the dream of restoring the Clinton era. The Democrat Party's platform document, Strong At Home, Respected In The World, however, envisages a Kerry presidency that would more resemble Jimmy Carter's rather than Bill Clinton - at least in foreign policy.
Nearly half of the pages of the document, just approved at the party's convention in Boston, are devoted to foreign policy, twice that of its predecessor in the 2000 presidential campaign.
The document , primarily designed to persuade American voters that, as president, Kerry would be at least as tough as President George W Bush on such issues as national security and the war on terror, is, perhaps, not a blueprint for American foreign policy in a putative Democratic administration. Nevertheless, it offers some insight into US foreign policy under a President Kerry.
The focus is on the Middle East and related issues of oil and terrorism. Issues like the future of Nato, the reform of the United Nations, the emergence of China and India, the accelerating rate of international regulations, and the global environment are mentioned but hardly tackled. The Kerry foreign policy would be different from that of Bush in at least three areas:
* Under Kerry, the US would forswear the right of pre-emptive action against its foes. It will employ its military only in a multilateral context, with the consent of the United Nations. Such a policy would give the UN and the allies, who are not identified, a veto on the use of force by the US. It also means that the US will act only after it is attacked, and not to prevent attack on itself or its allies. Afghanistan is offered as an illustration of a "good war".
It was right for the US to invade Afghanistan because the 9/11 attacks on New York and Washington had been orchestrated by Al Qaida from Afghan territory. This was also a "good war" because the UN approved it and the allies agreed to take part .
The Iraq war, however, was a bad one: the US should have waited until after an attack from Iraq before reacting. Call it the Pearl Harbor Doctrine, if you like, but, if adopted, it would offer insurance to such countries as North Korea and Iran. Pyongyang and Tehran would know that, short of attacking the US directly, they should fear no military retaliation.
* A Kerry administration would abandon Bush's commitment to promoting democracy, including by military pressure and/or action. Instead, the US will adopt the "soft power" method, using public diplomacy, battle of ideas, education, development aid, and human rights. (Here, the document echoes themes developed by Carter in 1976). This takes us back to détente during the Cold War in which preserving the status quo was more important than reshaping the world on the basis of democratic ideals.
The document insists that "democracy will not bloom over night", echoing Kerry's statement that spreading democracy would not be among his priorities. The document says a Kerry presidency will help "sustain voices of freedom against repressive regimes".
The word "sustain", used to avoid "support", is, meaningless in this context, while the label "repressive regimes", instead of "anti-democratic regimes", is unfortunate.
* In the war against terror, Kerry would put the emphasis on measures that the US and its allies must take within their realm rather than impose on others. This means police co-operation among the 60 countries with active terrorist cells. The US will orchestrate the freezing of terrorist assets and the closing of terrorist channels of communication. The problem, however, is that one man's terrorist is often someone else's "freedom fighter".
For example, Syria and Iran will never admit that the Hezbollah is a terrorist organisation and almost all Arab states refuse to label Hamas and Islamic Jihad as terrorist. There are also thousands of front organisations - charities and NGOs - enjoying high patronage in their respective countries, part or all of whose activities could be regarded as terrorist.
The governments concerned are unlikely to disband them to please Washington, especially if refusal to do so entails no costs. The document's suggestion to "name and shame" countries that finance terror is no deterrent. Many Arab leaders would love to be singled out as supporters of Hamas or Islamic Jihad because that would give them an almost heroic profile in their own neck of the wood.
Three specific cases
Though mostly concerned with generalities, the document cannot avoid three specifics. The first concerns Iraq. The document states that "people of goodwill will disagree about whether America should have gone to war in Iraq. This is bizarre.
Both Kerry and his vice-presidential running mate John Edwards are people of goodwill and yet did not disagree on the issue. Both voted for the liberation of Iraq twice and, to my knowledge, have said nothing to indicate regret on that score.
A Kerry administration may not have a clear policy on Iraq. The document proposes the nomination of an International High Commissioner, a kind of UN Pasha to rule Iraq for an unspecified period. But we are long past that in Iraq. There is no way that Bremer Pasha could be replaced by another Pasha. The Iraqis have an interim government and are preparing for elections within six months. So, who is going to impose a new Pasha on them and how?
The idea of a UN Pasha was first aired by French President Jacques Chirac before liberation. Chirac had even proposed former French Defence Minister Francois Leotard for the job. To try and put the clock back two years is no way of going forward in Iraq.
Perhaps anxious not to antagonise the Howard Dean wing of the party, the document, is vague about the role of US troops in Iraq. Kerry would keep them there but in the context of "an international presence".
But this is already the case. With the end of occupation the US and other coalition forces are in Iraq on the basis of a Security Council resolution. The UN has also appointed a new representative to Iraq. The problem is that he cannot go there because the UN does not want him to be protected by American and coalition troops while no one else offers soldiers for a UN "protection force".
All the 198 members of the UN are welcome to contribute troops to Iraq. But, apart from the 34 members of the US-led coalition, none seems willing to do so. Thus the document's proposal could mean only one thing: putting the existing US and coalition forces under the UN flag.
The second issue concerns Iran. The documents say: "A nuclear-armed Iran is an unacceptable risk to us and our allies." The use of the word "risk" instead of "danger" or "threat" is interesting. Risk has some positive connotations because it could involve bo
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