For many years, these were the terms in which the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was widely understood: The Palestinians were struggling for partition, while Israel was the reluctant party. On the surface, Israel's invasion of Gaza might appear to confirm that dynamic. But, in fact, the opposite is true: Israel's current war in Gaza could turn out to be a necessary step toward imposing a two-state solution on a Palestinian side that has long balked at partition.

We are back, it seems, at square one. In 1947, Zionists accepted the United Nations's partition plan because it would secure an area with a Jewish majority. Palestinians rejected it for much the same reason: If the land were not divided, they would have a clear Arab majority in all of it. While it is true that the idea of Greater Israel held appeal for many Israelis in the decades following the Six Day War, a solid majority in Israel turned toward partition in 1993 when it committed to the Oslo framework. In return for peace, Israel was ready to give up the vast majority of the West Bank and Gaza. Then came what Israelis understood to be the moment of truth: Camp David in 2000. Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak offered an almost full withdrawal from the occupied territories, including a division of Jerusalem. Yasir Arafat rejected the offer. There would be no deal, he insisted, without the right of return. Israelis knew the code: The right of return meant millions of Palestinians naturalized on the Israeli side of the divide. It was a plain, ringing "no" to partition.

Gradually, Israelis, or a great many of them, began to realize that history was repeating itself: As in 1947, the Palestinian leadership seemed determined to hold out for a single state--nominally a binational one--in which Jews would constitute a minority. Still, this took a while to sink in. In 2003, Labor's Amram Mitzna ran on a platform of unilateral withdrawal and was trounced by Likud's Ariel Sharon. Yet, two years later, Sharon implemented the very policy he had defeated in that election. The unilateral evacuation of Gaza was considered a success--and the polls predicted a clear victory for Sharon's new party, Kadima, which was poised to continue the same policy in the West Bank. The party won the election, despite Sharon's lapse into a coma. Ehud Olmert became prime minister. Olmert was adamant about the need for unilateral withdrawal and made clear that he would move the dividing line closer to the 1967 border than Sharon would have. At this point, full partition seemed right around the corner.