Focusing on 'Success' In Iraq

The December election in Iraq could prove to be a seminal event. The parliament elected last month will choose a president and prime minister, providing Iraq its first elected government under a constitution approved by referendum. This government may well seek, or at least welcome, changes in the foreign military presence. In addition, President Bush has made clear that it will need to take increasing responsibility for rebuilding the country politically and economically, while Iraqi armed forces take increasing responsibility for defeating the insurgency.

The election was preceded and accompanied by a bitter and emotional debate in the United States about the future of the U.S. presence in Iraq. The coincidence of these events may provide a unique opportunity to review the role of foreign military forces and the international community as Iraq takes its next steps back into the community of nations. Such a review could usefully begin by turning over to the historians questions about how and why we got into Iraq. Whatever questions remain, we are there in force, and the central issue that confronts us is how we move forward most effectively.

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The stakes -- for the United States and for the world -- are enormous. Iraq lies in the center of a region critical to the well-being of the global system. It is surrounded by states intensely concerned about the nature and future of that country and its government. A failed Iraq could be a catastrophe for the Middle East and a calamity for the world. At the moment such an outcome would be inevitable without the U.S. presence.

There are at least two elements essential to "success" in Iraq. The first is a central government that meets the needs of the people well enough to secure their sustained support, shows sufficient consideration for minority rights to win the loyalty of those minorities and demonstrates a credible determination to live in peace with its neighbors.

The second is an effective, highly disciplined military and security establishment that gives its allegiance not to various elements within Iraqi society but solely to the central government.

The fundamental question for the United States is what kind of policy is most likely to produce such an outcome and do so at a cost the American public is prepared to sustain. At the risk of oversimplification, it can be said that the "answers" proposed in the debate thus far fall into two broad categories. "Withdrawal" proposals range from immediate pullout to "setting a date certain." "Success" proposals range from "staying the course"(not clearly defined, but presumably meaning maintaining substantial forces in Iraq until the goals there have been achieved) to increasing the number of troops there.

The first category of proposals places primary emphasis on reducing the costs -- in blood and treasure -- that the United States is paying in Iraq. This would be achieved, however, by accepting (or ignoring) the very real risk that Iraq will not emerge as a viable state and that the region will descend into chaos. The second category of proposals underscores how critical it is to achieve "success." But the assumption is that the American people will continue to be willing to bear the burdens of Iraq indefinitely.

Both alternatives have unattractive or even unacceptable aspects. The real challenge is not to choose between them but to make the option that is most likely to advance the overall U.S. national interest -- the "success" option -- both more acceptable and more likely, by reducing its cost and risk. Clearly, progress has already been made, but we should do everything possible to enhance the prospects for success.