IRAN: THE DEATH OF ILLUSION
by Amir Taheri
New York Post
February 20, 2004

February 20, 2004 -- 'WE must turn a page and move on." So Ali Khamenei, the "Supreme Guide" of the Islamic Republic in Iran, advised his compatriots earlier this week. He was referring to the parliamentary elections held today and prearranged to ensure almost total victory for his own faction within the regime.

Even a month ago, not many would have predicted such an easy victory for the faction of which Khamenei is the figurehead. The rival faction, whose standard-bearer is supposed to be President Mohammad Khatami, was expected to put up a real fight. It did not, because, lacking a popular support base, it didn't have the stomach for a real fight.

The Iranian election experience puts an end to several illusions.

Illusion No. 1: That the mere holding of elections is a sign of democratization. Now we know that, although there can be no democracy without elections, it is possible to have elections without democracy.

The Khomeinist electoral recipe is simple and efficient.

It starts by making sure that all the candidates are handpicked for their total loyalty to the leader. Next, it makes sure that there is no real election campaign. The candidates are not allowed to criticize the leadership. Nor can they offer programs that differ with the essential options of the leadership.

The whole campaign lasts only one week, and no one is allowed to spend more than $10,000 on a campaign. Candidates are denied access to the heavy mass media such as radio and TV, and any material they put out must meet the authorities' approval.

Finally, winning a majority of votes is not enough. A victory must still be confirmed by no fewer than 11 different layers of authority, topped by the Council of the Guardians of the Revolution, which can nullify any or all of the results.

The purpose of such a system of elections is not to challenge the government of the day and to offer alternative policy choices. It is to pay allegiance to the rulers.

Illusion No. 2: That this regime can be reformed from within.

No system can be reformed unless it opens itself to new, especially rival, forces. And that means sharing power with groups and parties that, for one reason or another, have been excluded from decision-making.

Reform does not consist solely of new ways of doing things. It also requires that different people do at least some of those new things. We saw that fact illustrated in the Soviet Union of the late 1980s, when Mikhail Gorbachev wanted to change things while maintaining his Communist Party's monopoly on power.

Illusion No. 3: That Iran has a united domestic opposition force that has a coherent analysis of the nation's situation and a clear vision of its future.

Now we know that the so-called "reformist" camp did not exist except in the imagination of some Western commentators. This election has broken that "camp" into no fewer than 18 different groups, some of which have boycotted the elections while others, although denied the right to field candidates of their own, opposed the boycott in the name of revolutionary solidarity.

The "reformist" camp (which presented absolutely no major reform program in any field) consisted of a crowd as random as that of people at a bus stop who have nothing in common except a desire to get on the next bus.

A credible opposition cannot be made of occasional student riots, farcical sit-ins in the parliament, speeches about Schopenhauer and Hegel and Colgate smiles of the kind President Khatami excels in. Before anything else, it needs to show why the present system is bad and how and with what it should be replaced.

In the past decade or so, Iranian opposition has generated much heat but little light. It has shown a great deal of passion but little thought. Romantic preoccupation with vague generalities has been its wont, while the Khomeinist establishment has focused on the concrete issues of power and its practice.

In other words, the Iranian system is blocked not only because the establishment does not wish to share power (what establishment would?), but also because there is no credible opposition force on the scene.

It is not enough for a majority of the people to be unhappy with a regime for that regime to consent to change and reform. There can be no democratization without an opposition capable of offering clear alternatives to a government's analyses and policies.

WITH the death of these illusions, the Iranians, and others interested in Iran, must review some of their recent assumptions.

The key lesson to Iranians is that the alternative to this regime cannot emerge from within it. It is possible, and to some extent even happening now, that large segments of the establishment drift away from it. But, unless they are absorbed into an opposition, they will amount to nothing but flotsam and jetsam of a turbulent political life.

As the Prophet said: There is always something good in what happens. The Iranian election farce is no exception.

It shows that the present regime's legitimacy does not come from the ballot box but from its ability to impose its will by force if necessary. It obliges Iran's neighbors, and the major powers interested in the region, to abandon their illusions and to either accept the present regime on its own terms or designate it as a foe that must ultimately be brought down.

The death of illusions in Iran also means the death of the European policy of "constructive dialogue," first proposed by the Germans in the 1980s and now most actively pursued by the British. That policy was based on the assumption that the regime could reform itself, peacefully and speedily. It is now clear that it cannot.

Thus the Europeans face a stark choice:

* They can decide to hold their noses and continue dealing with the Iranian regime because they need its cooperation on a number of issues, notably nuclear nonproliferation, Iraq and Afghanistan.

* Or they can orchestrate a set of new diplomatic, economic and even military pressures on the regime as a means of encouraging the emergence of a genuinely democratic internal opposition.

For its part, the Bush administration needs to develop a coherent analysis of the Iranian situation. It must decide whether or not Iran is, in the words of the State Department's No. 2, Richard Armitage, a "sort of democracy," or a despotic regime using religion and violence to remain in power.