IRAQIS SHOULD NOT REPEAT THE MISTAKES MADE BY IRANIANS
by Amir Taheri
Gulf News
April 6, 2005

By Amir Taheri, Special to Gulf News   Is Iraq's new political elite about to repeat the tragic mistake of its Iranian counterpart in 1979? The question is prompted by the manoeuvres that have preceded the formation of a new transitional government in Baghdad. There are two ways of looking at the tractions which have caused consternation among the Iraqis. The first is to see them as the inevitable result of democratisation. Forming a coalition government even in the well-established democracies is a complicated task, let alone in a country emerging from half a century of brutal despotism. In this view, Iraqis should be allowed time to put their act together and come up with a coalition based on consensus. The second view is that the new Iraqi leadership elite is putting personal and sectarian considerations ahead of national interests, thus leading the country towards dangerous waters. The truth, as often is the case, lies somewhere in the middle. It is certain that the parties involved in the negotiations faced complex issues and that fostering consensus on a democratic constitution is no easy task. At the same time, however, it is also true that most of the parties involved appear to behave like people in a carpet bazaar rather than politicians trying to build a modern democracy. The new leadership elite has had it all too easy. The country was liberated by a US-led coalition with help from the Iraqi army which refused to fight for Saddam Hussain. Then it was Grand Ayatollah Ali Al Sistani who ended dissension among the Shiites, and frustrated attempts by Al Qaida linked groups to foment civil war. Finally, it was the turn of Iraqi voters to risk their lives and turn up en masse to give the new elite legitimacy. Up to now this elite has been the beneficiary of work done by others, including members of the new Iraqi police and army who are killed by terrorists on an almost daily basis. In that sense the new Iraqi political elite resembles the one that emerged in Tehran after the Shah's regime collapsed in the winter of 1979. The Carter administration had helped by persuading commanders of the Iranian armed forces not to crush the revolution. The Shiite clergy, under the twin leadership of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini and Ayatollah Kazem Shariatmadari, had helped by mobilising street support for the new regime. But when the new elite took over in Tehran it didn't have a clue as to what it was supposed to do. Iran's new elite, like the one in Iraq today, was a tower of Babel of ideologies. There were a dozen Communist outfits and other Marxist or Marxist-Islamist parties, at least four Mossadeqists groups, and more than a dozen religious-political associations. And, again like Iraq today, returning exiles played a central role in all groups. Having played little part in bringing about a revolution that succeeded in four months and without much of a fight, the new elite was anxious to conjure some post-factum revolutionary credentials. It also wanted to minimise its debt to the ayatollahs who had mobilised the muscle in the streets and the Americans who had made sure that the army would cave in. Some members of the new Iranian elite tried to win revolutionary credential by advocating the most radical measures imaginable. One was the wholesale nationalisation of all sectors of the economy in the name of "Islamic justice". Another was to shut down all universities for two years so that a "cultural revolution" could be carried out by returning exiles. Competition to appear radical forced some groups towards more dangerous games. One such game consisted of raiding the US Embassy and holding its diplomats hostage. The first attempt, by a Communist group known as People's Fedayeen, concerned the outer courtyard of the embassy only, and ended within hours, providing some "revolutionary" images for the evening's television news bulletin. The next group, because it had to appear more radical, entered the embassy building, manhandled a few employees, filmed its revolutionary television footage, and left after a day or so. By then it was obvious that we were facing a radicalisation auction. The third group, led by one Habiballah Payman, a leftist dentist, seized the whole of the compound and held everyone there hostage. Initially, it had intended to stay just three days, thus proving to be more revolutionary than the previous attackers who had stayed only a day. At this time a religious group close to Khomeini stepped in to seize control of the operation and to make the occupation of the embassy permanent. The message was clear: no one could outbid the genuine Khomeinists in any radicalisation auction. The new elite's demagoguery and incompetence left the nation without effective government, thus encouraging fissiparous tendencies in various provinces. One Communist group declared a people's republic in part of a northeastern province. Two other Marxist groups hoisted the flag of secession in a number of towns in the northwest. With the US embassy drama approaching fever pitch, it was soon clear that post-Shah Iran was heading for troubled waters. Throughout that period, Khomeini was in Qom, insisting that mullahs should play no direct role in government. Nevertheless, ministers and leaders from various political groups journeyed to Qom to ask him to sort out their differences. Today, some claim that Khomeini was lying even then and that, behind the scenes, he was sowing dissension within the new elite and pushing the various groups towards more radical positions. This may have been the case. But the fact remains that, initially, Khomeini insisted that mullahs stay out of government. Inevitably, the time came when the new elite had been so discredited and the country so misgoverned that Khomeini appeared to be obliged to move to Tehran and assume direct leadership. The new Iraqi leaders, who are constantly rushing to Najaf to involve Al Sistani in their petty quarrels, recall the elite that destroyed Iran's historic opportunity in 1979. There are, to be sure, important differences between Iran in 1979 and Iraq today. The Iraqi people do not wish to repeat the tragedy of their Iranian neighbours. In Iran the source of legitimacy was the revolution while in Iraq it is the general election of last January. In Iran, where Shiites account for 89 per cent of the population, rule by the mullahs, initially believed to be temporary, was not a trigger for civil war. In Iraq, however, any attempt at imposing "mullahrchy" is bound to b      Copyright © 1998 - 2024 by IranANDWorld.Com. All rights reserved.